



Heeding the Microcultural Contexts of  Art
IntroductIon
discussions about art history are taking a multi-cultural turn,1 yet they are still dominated 
by Eurocentric voices, even those attempting to accommodate the history and traditions of 
the other. this paper makes a plea for a new relational mode of discourse, for recording 
and analysing a range of explanations of the experience of ‘art’, both within our own cultural 
parameters and relating to other times and spaces, as well as the microcontexts within we 
make ‘sense’ of art and its history. 
Art’s HIstory
the history of art was founded as a Western academic discipline largely upon the work 
of German theorists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. the discipline, from 
Winckelmann to Wölfflin, whilst constantly shifting its premises and elaborating its theoretical 
positions, tried to make epistemological sense of the heritage of Greek and roman classicism, 
the humanist and scientific developments of the Italian Renaissance, and the subsequent 
efflorescence of Western art – particularly painting, sculpture and architecture.2 James Elkins 
emphasises the Eurocentric focus of the discipline and its narrow conception of what it is 
that constitutes ‘art’: “most images are not art. In addition to pictures made in accord with 
the Western concept of art, there are also those made outside of the West or in defiance, 
ignorance, or indifference to the idea of art. non-Western images are not well described in 
terms of art, and neither are medieval paintings that were made in the absence of humanist 
ideas of artistic value.”3
In the twentieth century there were increasing attempts in the West to expand the notion of 
art,4 in terms of both time and space, to include, for example, the cave paintings of Lascaux, 
the architecture of Pre-columbian Mesoamerica and the skin-art of Polynesia: roger Fry 
wrote about “the Art of the Bushmen” in 1910, “Ancient American Art” in 1918 and “negro 
sculpture” in 1920.5 
ARTICLE
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this expansion of the Western concept was, and is, by no means universally accepted.6 
However, the possibility of expanding the notion of art’s history gradually gained some 
acceptance, due in part to Western experience of the art of ‘others’ as a consequence of 
‘exploration’ and colonisation. In the wake of the Enlightenment curiosity about the other 
became systematised into the science of ‘anthropology’. Western scholars, such as durkheim, 
Boas, Malinowski and Marquet,7 not only recorded, sorted the data, hypothesised paradigms 
of knowledge, but also began to make links between the role played by art in the cultures 
of Others and of the West. It began to be recognised that all images act in culturally specific 
ways as visual voices, bearing meaning, expressing feelings and desires, giving expression 
to culturally bound concepts, traditions, and ‘histories.’ 
these attempts at recontextualising and expanding the West’s normative sense of art,8 even 
floating the possibility of multiple realities,9 came from the fieldwork, the thoughts and pens 
of Western scholars looking in from the outside at non-Western cultures, often unreflectingly 
designated as ‘primitive’. the art of the non-West was discussed, explained, spoken for, by 
Western voices comprehending the non-West through Western academic mind-sets.
sPEAkInG For otHErs, sPEAkInG For onEsELF
Western scholars quite routinely speak for others, explaining the significance, even the 
meaning of the art of non-Western societies. Foucault and deleuze maintain that any speaking 
or writing for others is, in itself, a form of repression. Western scholarship, for example, 
assumes, generally without question, the right to speak about the art of the living and the 
dead of all cultures. these assumptions occasionally acknowledge historical evidence from 
Other cultures which may convey local notions about the significance of visual and tactile 
objects: sometimes the opinions of representatives of contemporary non-Western cultures 
are canvassed. More commonly what appear to be arrogant assumptions of the right to speak 
from the bastions of cultural dominance, such as universities, publishing houses, journals, 
the electronic media, effectively stifle the voices of Others. The assumption of this right, as 
Foucault radically emphasised, is a form of fascism, a fascism ‘in our heads’, that is not, of 
course, limited to Western scholarship.10
Any attempt to overcome these fascist impulses entails a discussion of the right to speak, 
particularly about the cultural products of others.11 
It goes without saying that we may speak on our own behalf, to express the way we experience 
and understand our selfhood, as well the world and its art. We also, it seems to me, have the 
right to review the records of history in the public domain, to seek to verify data relating to the 
production, utilisation, evaluation, collection, trade, recording, preservation and conservation 
of works of art from whatever culture. By ‘evaluation’ in this context I have in mind exclusively 
the documentary status of such records.
MAkInG sEnsE oF HIstory
An ethical problem arises when we attempt to assess these records, recast them into a 
narrative, write a history, and make some sense of them. that ‘sense’ will depend very much 
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on the microcultural and historical position we are given and assume as speakers and writers. 
The choice of our topic of enquiry, the angle we take, the tenor of our voice, will reveal our 
relationship to the data of recorded history. 
there is no doubt, in my mind, that we all have a right to ‘make sense’ of any recorded history. 
However, any making sense, any going outside the available record, will inevitably entail the 
engagement of critical judgement, the spin we put upon the archive. Language signifies, 
and when disseminated through the media, exercises, even manipulates, the minds, and 
hence the opinions, of others about the world and their place in it. ‘Making sense’ – scholarly 
discourse, criticism, popular journalism, points of view, are verbal processes enacted in 
fields of contestation: as competitive beings we forever exercise the fascism in our heads. 
We speak from a cultural context, and though that culture is forever in flux, it is also in direct 
contestation with other cultural positions.
We can try to be aware of this, to understand what it is that we do when we ‘make sense’ of 
art and its history, and recognise the effects that activity may have on others, and, reflexively, 
back upon ourselves.12
the archive, the record, the historians making sense of them, the institutions disseminating 
critical judgements, the media making them available to the public, are, for the most part, 
in the hands of dominant cultural élites, and therefore, by default, it is their opinions that 
are disseminated most widely and persistently, infiltrating the minds of the dominated, 
themselves usually educated within Westernising institutions of cultural authority. (Australian 
aboriginals, for example, learn about the history of their ‘art’ through the filter of Western 
scholarship and critical commentary.) Because of that dominance, it is generally the ideas 
of Western critical thinkers that are disseminated through the institutions of educational 
authority, voicing opinions related to the exercise of power, and their effects on the cultures 
of the powerless.
discussing the position of the art of Aboriginals in the Australian artworld of the 1980s Anne-
Marie Willis and tony Fry made an impassioned plea for the West to understand that the 
exercise of intellectual appropriation is a major dilemma for culturally dominated/marginalised 
people.13 they claimed that the institutional mechanisms of the Western artworld applied 
to the emergence of the post-Papunya florescence of Australian Aboriginal art – dealers, 
galleries, criticism, commentary, buying and selling -- was “overt or covert, structural and 
institutional racism”, that “much of what is named as ‘progress’ is the assimilation of 
signs of difference into a homogenising system, the [Western] art market.”14 In particular 
Willis and Fry emphasised the lack of any conceptual or practical link between a supposed 
‘progress’ of Aboriginal artists in the Australian artworld and any shift to overcome the social 
marginalisation of the Australian Aboriginal people. In their attempt to ‘make sense’ of the 
‘fate’ of Australian Aboriginal art Willis and Fry made a broader claim that there should be 
a necessary relationship between the marketability of non-Western art forms and political 
and social advancement (however that might be understood). Willis and Fry refer to other 
Australian writers who take positions on this subject, but nowhere in this debate could I hear 
an Aboriginal voice, or even that Aboriginals had been approached to offer their own opinions 
on what was being claimed on their behalf. 
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otHErInG
Hal Foster claims that “this othering in identification, in representation [a ‘selving’ of the 
other]…alienates the other, confirms rather than closes the gap between the two through a 
reductive, idealistic, or otherwise misbegotten representation.”15 the danger implied here, in 
speaking for the supposed plight of others, is to assume a truth in alterity and the exercise, 
however well meant, of ideological patronage.
EMIc And EtIc
‘Making sense’ of history often entails giving meaning, not only to the narrative, but also to 
individual works of art. We may legitimately voice the experience of spectatorship, but often 
go beyond that to claim – albeit often without thinking – through experience, the fruits of 
scholarship, or the fascism of the mind, to know, or to have a lien on the meaning of a work, 
a group of works, a school, a culture. 
For example, it would be presumptuous for a non-Máori to claim to know the ‘meaning,’ the 
somatic, psychic, cultural and historical significance for a Máori, of a particular ancestral 
cloak.16 to do so would presume the exercise of power, of cultural authority, to take it for 
granted that Western ‘knowledge’ is authentic knowledge, and that its expression outspeaks 
any other voice. such an act might foreclose any attempt to put an other point of view, indeed 
might intimidate the other into a shamed silence.
It might equally be claimed that any knowledge about the aesthetic and cultural significance 
of a particular Máori cloak can come only from an emic (insider) intimacy, a knowledge 
essentially unavailable to others, including Westerners.
Both positions create a binary opposition, a political contestation of rights to speak, of systems 
of knowing, between the culturally dominating and the dominated, those colonising the 
mind of others, and rebellious others seeking not only to decolonise their own pathways to 
knowledge, but also to shift the understanding of the West, to deconstruct, in various senses, 
the edifice of Western systems of knowledge. 
yet our relation to things is more complex than simple binary oppositions: narratives that 
seek to make sense of the world and the expression of spectatorship may be multiplied to 
infinity. For example, what ‘art’ is depends upon a variety of contestations in the mind of 
any practitioner, historian, critic or viewer. ‘knowing’ what a thing is, and understanding the 
relationships between things and our attitudes towards them, are not discrete acts, bounded, 
forever fixed, but processes under constant review.
If we return to the putative Máori cloak, there is no way a non-Máori will not have access 
to the sight of it, and that sight will immediately trigger a visual and evaluative response, 
shuffling through the history of visual experience and evaluative criteria in the memory. For 
every non-Máori viewer the experience will be different. this act of visual experience then 
becomes a form of knowledge. That knowledge may be extended by enquiry, both within the 
repositories of discourse relating to such objects available to the viewer within their own 
language culture, but also through discussion with others, including Máori. ‘Facts’, opinions 
about the cloak, accumulate, to create constantly shifting fields of ‘knowledge’ about it. 
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these phenomenological experiences will be forever etic (outsider), but forms of ‘knowledge’ 
nevertheless, which the possessor has every right to voice, to disseminate, but strictly on the 
understanding that it is not ‘the’ knowledge, but a set of ideas and experiences that makes up 
a particular knowledge, a particular point of view that can always be contested by Máori and 
non-Máori alike. this is not appropriation, but a legitimate etic right to speak. to hold that this 
is not so is to indulge in a protective counter-culturalism, sometimes amounting to counter-
racism, that so limits the right to speak, so compartmentalises the right to ‘knowledge’, as 
to lead to a rupture in communication, a ghettoisation of knowledge systems. 
For example, robert Jahnke, a Máori, an artist and university scholar, wrote a review of david 
neich’s Painted Histories, a study that related the intricate story of nineteenth-century Máori 
representational painting, which was heavily influenced by the conventions of both recently 
introduced christianity and European art.17 Jahnke questioned whether Neich, and other non-
Máori historians and anthropologists, could ever experience Máori art emicly (as insiders), even 
though neich had a good knowledge of the Máori language. Jahnke claimed, in effect, that 
knowledge of a language, knowledge of a history, intimate knowledge of art objects, cannot, 
in themselves, create the conditions to experience art emicly. one must be a functioning 
member of a living culture to think, feel and communicate in such a way, a way, he implies, 
which is phenomenologically not only more authentic but also more legitimate.
there is no gainsaying the particular experience of the emic point of vantage. We can only 
learn about the experience of others through the expression of their emic (insider) voice. For 
example, Frantz Fanon and bell hooks have graphically described how it feels, emicly, to be fixed 
with blackness, out of their own experience of being black in white-dominated cultures.18 
Jahnke questioned the cultural accuracy of some of Neich’s conclusions about Máori 
nineteenth-century design, with post-colonial writers, as well as emic informants, in mind:19 
I would argue that one cannot see oppression if one is not oppressed nor can 
one think oppression if one is not oppressed...When we view a kahuhuruhuru 
([Máori] feather cloak) in the confines of the museum showcase our perception 
of this taonga [cultural treasure] is impaired by the institutionalised boundaries 
of display that include enclosure and articulation conditioned by contingencies 
of space and light. Although the enclosure may permit an accommodating 
vision, and articulation may offer a glimpse of structure, and illumination may 
generate an aura of seduction, interpretation is institutionally bound. Even the 
pedagogical label is a mere constriction of text that predicates an ethnocentric 
order...unless one is able to don the cultural cloak, to feel its texture, to be 
encompassed by its warmth, to witness the reaction of surface to wind, rain 
and sun, to live in and to be at one with the cloak, a comprehensive sensual 
affinity with the cloak is masked by distance...All the senses must be implicated 
in the experience of the cultural cloak. one must witness the translucency and 
opacity of hue; hear the rustle of feathers; smell the odour of presence within 
the weft and warp, taste the secretion of age. only then can one react to the 
nuances of the cultural imprint.20 
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But does simply being the member of a particular culture entitle the speaker to claim to speak 
on behalf of the culture as a whole? Surely the concept of the authentic voice applies equally 
within the emic frame: one can speak on one’s own behalf, from a particular knowledge, based 
upon upbringing, embodied experience, memory, set of opinions, but have no right to speak 
on behalf of others. In the case of a specific Máori cloak one would need to be an appropriate 
person in a functioning Máori society contemporary with the cloak’s use, to be able to have an 
uncontestable phenomenological sense of its ‘meaning’ and significance for a wearer at that 
time and in that space. It is not enough to be an historian, or even a descendent from within 
the same culture living at a time when the feather cloak no longer functions exactly as it did 
in the past. We might point out the metaphorical thrust of Jahnke’s rhetoric, his passion to 
put the emic voice, to state the claims of the oppressed against etic, dominant scholarship. 
the effect of his review, however, it seems to me, is simply to raise the stakes in a binary 
contestation of systems of knowledge.
there will always exist problems of power in the relations of those with the authority to 
speak and those with a sense that ‘their’ culture has been taken from them and its history 
colonised by outsiders. But isn’t it equally true to say that none of us possess an exclusive 
right to pronounce upon a subject merely through the claim of cultural association or ethnicity, 
not least because culture and ethnicity themselves are constructed from constantly shifting 
‘facts’, attitudes, evaluations and systems of knowledge? 
It is enough here to point out the ethical dangers that lie in wait when the social historian of art 
confers etic or emic judgements on art objects. After all, as actors in our own culture, we are 
ineluctably bound to its ways of thinking, valorising, systematising and writing history. there 
are rich veins of ambiguity in both emic information and etic assessment. Any attempts to 
‘iron’ them out in favour of some, inevitably fictive, laundered theory are themselves open to 
question as to motive. Jahnke wants to bring our attention to possible pitfalls in assessments 
of Máori art by non-Máori, but the complexities of emic-cultural judgements are as extensive 
as those made cross-culturally. such complexities are part and parcel of the richness of art 
and its history and evaluation, both for emic subjects feeling disenfranchised from speaking 
about their own culture, and for etic observers analysing a system to which they do not 
culturally belong.
ExPLAInInG tHE PosItIon FroM WHIcH WE sPEAk
If historians, of any ethnicity, have a right to speak about the work of caravaggio, why not 
about Máori painting? Equally doesn’t any Máori have the right to speak about Jackson 
Pollock, chinese ceramics or African sculpture? What is said about any of these subjects is 
the responsibility of the speaker, but others have a legitimate right to ask for an explanation 
of their position – to enquire as to their own cultural antecedents, their ethnicity, the systems 
of knowledge to which they are in thrall, their experience of the subject matter, their evaluative 
criteria, the well-springs of their prejudices. 
We are now in a position, due to the hard thinking of the past hundred years, mainly in the West, 
but also enriched by non-Western contributors (such as Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, Edward 
said, trinh Minh-ha, olu oguibe), ironically usually writing for a Western audience, employed 
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by a Western-financed institution and published by the Western press (at present there are 
few other choices), to reconsider both the history of art and approaches to an understanding 
and evaluation of the contribution to our globalising culture of the art of the present.
At our most optimistic it may be possible to claim that art’s history has been so laundered 
by theory as to be able to conduct a culturally nuanced approach to the study of the making, 
use and evaluation of works of art, of cultural attitudes towards the creation of their histories, 
and is able to situate them in the forever-fluid flux of political and economic dynamics. That 
flux would include all the voices that have been raised about particular manifestations of art 
and culture, whilst acknowledging that the voices that have been preserved will almost always 
come through the filters of dominant cultures, the exercisers of power. Most Other voices have 
been lost on the battlefields of cultural contestation, in the maelstrom of history.
rELAtIonAL ModEs oF dIFFErEncE
yet, rather than emphasising binary structures of otherness, discrete space-times, or the 
emic-etic divide (in which the emic voice often re-inscribes itself into the etic history), might 
art history and criticism not be directed towards relational modes of difference, to recording 
and analysing a range of explanations of experience, the contexts within which ‘making 
sense’ takes place? Within such a matrix is it possible to extend the Enlightenment Project 
and postmodern speculation about the trajectories of histories and the right to speak?21
LISTENINg TO THE VOIcE OF OTHERS
Despite the destruction of traditions by globalising capitalism and the commodification of 
history, we now have the intellectual apparatus to hear a wider range of voices.22 However, 
to hear claims to a range of alternative histories, particularly those relating to unfamiliar or 
marginalised cultural groups, others – particularly Western Others – have to make the space 
to listen. 
It is not that performances of listening are not enacted, but that these performances are 
often ritualised along lines of political correctness and cultural position-taking that only 
serve to re-emphasise the binary divide. For example, an exhibition of Máori art will open 
with a ritualised ceremony, yet the passage of such ritualised time only serves to underline 
difference, mutual incomprehension and condescension. After the ceremony each group will 
view the exhibition from their separate spheres. Indeed the art will probably be exhibited in 
a space where it has little any more to do with the daily lives of either Máori or non-Máori, 
but is, like many visual art performances, elevated into a space supposedly enclaved from 
commodification, but controlled by the dominant culture and placed outside the possibility 
of any day-to-day cultural and meaningful utilisation. 
FIELds oF contEstAtIon
talking about art is an intellectual activity. Intellectual activities cannot be detached from 
struggles for power – the power of claimed knowledge, of the right to judge, of the authority of 
expertise, of the right to explain, of the control of exhibition spaces and promotional advertising. 
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though everyone may exercise their intellectual muscles in bouts of cultural contestation, 
may raise their voice to be heard, the battlegrounds and speaking platforms are usually in 
the gift of power-sanctioned institutions: the lecturer speaks from the university podium, the 
historian writes in the peer-reviewed journal, the critic writes up shows in the dealer or civic 
galleries for the capitalist-controlled press.
Marginal groups often themselves engage on fields of contestation. The new media artist 
Rea, herself an Australian Aboriginal, made a three-screen DVD work entitled maang (2006). 
Part of one of the DVDs shows the removal of the Pitinjarra people from their ancestral land 
in 1965 to make way for a British nuclear test. As rea pointed out in an interview at the 
Auckland Art Gallery (10 March 2007), the descendants of the Pitinjarra people tried to stop 
her using this film, or, as Rea put it, tried to exercise ‘censorship’, for unarticulated reasons 
of their own. As the film was already in the public domain Rea felt it possible to override the 
objections in a cause that was as much her own as that of the Pitinjarra.
struggles to be heard are not for the faint hearted. the dominated and marginalised often 
fall silent, despairing that what they have to say will be ignored, and even if heard will be 
misunderstood. 
rIGHts And rEsPonsIBILItIEs
But, as Foucault has pointed out, the present does not rest upon immutable necessities.23
If there is to be any mutual understanding of different cultural positions then all must have 
a right to speak and others a responsibility to listen and, in their turn, a right to be heard, 
and heard with sufficient patience for some mutual comprehension to take place. There is 
no essential ‘truth’ to be discovered, only the pursuit of a constantly re-engaged dialogue, 
an interweaving of explanations.
such explanations would explore the origins of our knowledge, of our opinions, of our feelings 
about a work of art, how these have been formed by culture and experience. It will take us 
some time to unwind the complexities of our opinions, our feelings, our cultural positions, 
the history of our evaluative criteria. Without understanding that these complexities exist, 
and bear upon our understanding of the art of each ‘other,’ then art history will continue to 
ride roughshod over the potential sensitivities of its discipline in order to claim power for one 
position over another, to claim the authority for one culture’s version of history over that of 
another.24
It follows that seldom will voices be raised about art or its history in unison. Indeed there 
is no point in seeking consensus in such a variety of claimed facts and experience. only by 
listening, in profound attentiveness, to the voice of others is it possible to gauge the common 
ground, the spheres of commensurability, and the fissures that divide, the paths of thought 
and experience that diverge.
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